|
Commentary
|
|
Go
back to the previous section of this chapter...
Go back to the book
index page... |
|
Commentary
|
|
|
8-1 |
1998: A "made-for-Television" Impeachment?
In
early January 1998, Washington events were at low ebb, as they
typically are in January. However, it was clear that a number of
"Clinton scandals" remained as open issues, in various phases of
investigation, and in various venues including Congress.
Furthermore, several of these investigations related to potential
wrongdoing that had both occurred during the Clinton administration,
and that arguably involved serious misuse and abuse of institutions
of the Federal government. The White House had obtained hundreds of
FBI files illegitimately — open questions remained regarding both
how and why the files were obtained. The recent Clinton Presidential
campaign fund raising violations included the possibility of illegal
participation by foreign citizens and/or foreign governments,
including China, in the U.S. election process. Additional questions
were being raised regarding Chinese access to U.S. technology that
could be used for military purposes, including building
intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads that could be used
against the U.S. All these areas of investigation potentially
involved wrongdoing that was so serious that if President Clinton
could be shown to be involved, such wrongdoing would clearly raise
the issue of his impeachment. |
|
|
|
|
8-2 |
1998
was an election year. Given the open issues, and a Republican
controlled Congress, it was almost certain that Congress would
become increasingly persistent and demanding in pursuing several
areas of investigation.
For
years, Congress has been studied along the line of the consideration
Members of Congress give to their political base — and this base is
typically seen as the core of either the Republican or the
Democratic party. During 1997, Republicans had become angry about
the Clinton scandals, and what seemed to have become an almost
institutionalized cover-up. Democrats were also frequently angered
when the Republican Congress was portrayed to them as favoring the
rich, the powerful, and the special interests, and not caring about
the average American. |
|
|
|
|
8-3 |
However, in addition to their political bases, the Members of
Congress were also closely watching their economic base of campaign
contributors. Some elements of this base were ideologically aligned
with their political bases. But for all incumbents, Republican and
Democrat, a significant element of the economic base of campaign
contributors has no ideological agenda, but rather is interested in
specific issues before Congress that will affect their own
interests. Their concern was maintaining stability, a strong
economy, and whatever advantages they had secured through years of
lobbying and campaign contributions. As a political question,
Members of Congress were interested in meeting the expectations of
both their political and their economic bases.
It was
apparent that any one of a number of pending investigations could
reach a point where impeachment of the President became a
possibility. It was also apparent that should an impeachment be
based on an issue as potentially explosive as national security, or
campaign finance, political divisions could become even sharper.
Washington's political forecast in early 1998 was something like:
Low-hanging, over-saturated clouds of political conflict, widely
scattered scandals, pollution at toxic levels — impeachment
possible. In a way, the real question was: which investigation storm
front would open up first? |
|
|
|
|
8-4 |
Given
this dangerous, volatile situation, many people in Washington must
have wondered if there was any way to clear the air, to release the
electric charge that had built up between the two political bases.
During 1997 and up to early 1998, the Clintons might have wished
that if they did have to face an impeachment, it would be one where
the alleged wrongdoing was relatively minor, and posed no immediate,
obvious threat to the nation. As we have seen, they must have
believed they had good prospects for defeating that kind of
impeachment on Constitutional grounds. The worst danger was of a
sudden, out-of-control impeachment proceeding, possibly involving
national security, that could be impossible to predict regarding the
outcome or the effect. From the Clintons point of view, the
preferable option might have been to have some kind of drawn out,
year long process, even possibly one that resulted in an
impeachment, but on grounds that were so difficult and murky that
the prospect of a Senate conviction would be highly unlikely. It
would be even better if the course of events left everyone
thoroughly sick of the whole idea of impeachment and scandal.
Amazingly enough, that’s exactly what happened. |
|
|
|
|
8-5 |
In late
January 1998, just before President Clinton’s State of the Union
address, televisions, front pages and cover articles reported that
the President had been involved in an improper relationship with
Monica Lewinski, who had been a White House intern. It was reported
that President Clinton may have perjured himself in his deposition
testimony on the relationship, conducted as part of the Paula Jones
sexual harassment case. Coverage of this story was the number one
media event of the year.
Meanwhile, on March 9, 1998, U.S. News and World Report
published a short "In brief" blurb titled: "Campaign finance reform
dies." [54] |
|
|
|
|
8-6 |
On
January 16, 1998, the day Lewinski was detained by Starr's
investigators, Lewinski's mother, Marcia Lewis, came to Washington
to be with her daughter. On February 23, 1998, Newsweek
reported that Lewinski was reported to have "told her mother that
the prosecutors had laid down a threat: unless Monica agreed to wear
a secret recording device to entrap Clinton and his friend Vernon
Jordan that night, she was 'going to jail.'" [55] On February
9, 1998 Time reported on an unusual aspect to the case:
Lewinski's mother was engaged to "R. Peter Straus, an opera buff who
met Lewis at one of her book signings." [56] Time reported:
"Straus is also a close family friend of Vernon Jordan's. 'I feel
like I've known Vernon forever,' he says, 'and I honestly cannot
identify when and where we first met.'" Straus denied ever having a
conversation about Lewinski or Lewis with Vernon Jordan. On February
23, 1998 Newsweek reported that when Lewis was required by
Starr to testify to a grand jury about her daughter "Lewis was so
upset about the experience that a nurse had to be summoned and her
interrogation stopped. 'It was disgusting what they did to her,'
Monica's lawyer, William Ginsburg, told Newsweek." [57] On May 11,
1998 US News published a two page article on the marriage of
Straus and Lewis.The article noted: "As a matter of law, the
marriage would enable Straus and Lewis to invoke spousal privilege
if either were called upon to testify against the other..." US
News reported: "[A] source close to the Clinton administration
who has spoken with Straus has told U.S. News that Straus — a
one time protege of Edward Bernays, the father of American public
relations — has played a significant role in at least some parts of
Lewinski’s case. According to that source, Straus was, for instance,
the strategist who advised Lewinski to stick to her original
affidavit denying a sexual relationship with Clinton..." US News
reported: "Despite his extensive contact with Lewis, and the close
bond she shares with her daughter, Straus says he has only met
Lewinsky ‘maybe three times in my life’ — all of them last fall when
she was in New York for job interviews." [58] |
|
|
|
First
section |
|
Go
to the next section of this chapter...
Go back to the book
index page... |
|
Last
section |
|
Previous |
Next |
| Back
to top |
| |